Judicial Hazing of Newbie Attorneys is a bad thing!

Once in a blue moon, Judges do receive censure for their conduct. This is the last public reproval of a California judge in the last two and a half years. I guess this shows that the remainder of the sixteen-hundred or so judges are doing their job right, and behaving in a "judicial" manner.

Order of Removal of Judge Bruce Van Voorhis,
February 27, 2003


Judge Bruce Van Voorhis of the Contra Costa County Superior Court was ordered removed from office by the Commission on February 27, 2003, for willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. The Commission’s actions concluded formal proceedings, during which there was a hearing before special masters and an appearance before the Commission. The judge filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on September 10, 2003. On December 9, 2003, the judge submitted a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. That petition was denied on March 22, 2004.

The Commission determined that the judge engaged in prejudicial misconduct when he made statements giving the appearance that he had made a legally questionable ruling during a criminal trial to see how an inexperienced prosecutor would react.

The Commission found that Judge Van Voorhis mistreated attorneys on numerous occasions. In one criminal trial, the judge interjected a lengthy series of questions and comments about defense counsel’s cross-examination that disparaged the attorney’s professional competence; these included comments about what the attorney should have learned in law school. This constituted prejudicial misconduct. In another criminal trial, the judge questioned a prosecutor in a sarcastic and condescending manner in the presence of the jury, suggesting through his questions that she was acting inappropriately and perhaps unethically in seeking to introduce certain evidence that she reasonably and in good faith viewed as admissible. This was willful misconduct because the purpose of the judge’s comments was to ridicule the prosecutor and to vent the judge’s anger or frustration. In addition, the judge’s attack on the prosecutor’s personal motives and his ridicule of her appeared to show conscious disregard for the limits of the judge’s authority, since the judge previously had been publicly reproved by the Commission for poor demeanor, and had been cautioned orally and in writing about his demeanor by the presiding judge two weeks before the incident. In another matter, the judge engaged in prejudicial misconduct when he told a deputy public defender born in Ecuador that he should "lose" his accent. In a criminal trial, the judge in the presence of the jury engaged in a lengthy, antagonistic critique of a prosecutor’s performance and ethics. The judge attacked the prosecutor’s legal training, professional competence, and motives, and accused her of breaking the law, when it should have been obvious to him that the prosecutor, who was inexperienced, had innocently misunderstood what she could do. This was willful misconduct because the judge’s personal attacks were made for the purpose of venting his anger or frustration. In another criminal trial, the judge angrily ordered a prosecutor to tell the jury that relevant evidence, which she in good faith was attempting to introduce, did not "mean anything." The judge admittedly had no authority that permitted him to order a lawyer to confess her mistakes to the jury. The judge’s comments were made for the corrupt purpose of venting his anger or frustration. This was willful misconduct. In the same trial, the judge in the presence of the jury angrily badgered the prosecutor into acquiescing in the judge’s view that certain evidence was relevant. This was willful misconduct, as the judge’s comments were made for the purpose of venting his anger or frustration.

The Commission also found that the judge engaged in mistreatment of court staff. In one instance he yelled at a temporary court clerk and threw a stack of files; the clerk was reduced to tears. In a second incident, the judge angrily berated an experienced court clerk in open court for swearing in a bailiff in the customary manner. In a third matter, the judge publicly humiliated a new security deputy because the judge was frustrated with the sheriff’s department when an inmate was not brought to court. Each of these actions constituted prejudicial misconduct.

In addition, the Commission found that Judge Van Voorhis engaged in prejudicial misconduct when he made comments critical of the grammar used in a question submitted by the jury; his comments were condescending, disparaging, and embarrassing to the jury foreperson and the other jurors.

The Commission identified five considerations relevant to its determination of appropriate discipline of Judge Van Voorhis: (1) the number of acts of misconduct; (2) the effect of prior discipline on the judge’s conduct; (3) whether the judge appreciates the inappropriateness of his actions; (4) whether the judge is likely to continue to engage in unethical conduct; and (5) the impact of the judge’s misconduct on the judicial system. The Commission also noted that any factors in mitigation advanced by the judge would be considered.

In turning to the first factor, the Commission noted that there does not appear to be any minimum number of acts required for removal, and cited past cases in which removal has been based on a pattern of misconduct. The Commission pointed out that Judge Van Voorhis had engaged in four acts of willful misconduct and seven instances of prejudicial misconduct, and that these instances were part of a persistent pattern of abuse and arbitrary conduct.

Turning to prior discipline, the Commission noted that Judge Van Voorhis had been publicly reproved in 1992 for conduct that included mistreatment of jurors, a judicial colleague, court staff and attorneys. In addition, he had been privately admonished in 1994 for issuing subpoenas in his own dissolution case and signing them using his official title. Finally, he had been advised both orally and in writing by his presiding judge in 1999 that he still had a demeanor problem that needed to be addressed. On the question of whether the judge appreciated his misconduct, the Commission noted that Judge Van Voorhis’s actions and testimony showed a lack of such appreciation. The Commission found that it was "close to a certainty" that Judge Van Voorhis, if allowed to remain on the bench, would continue to violate the Code of Judicial Ethics. Finally, the Commission stated that Judge Van Voorhis’s misconduct seriously undermined the public’s confidence in and respect for the judicial system.

The Commission considered in mitigation the judge’s offer of evidence provided by attorneys of his good judicial character; the Commission also noted that the judge’s industriousness and efficiency, as well as his intensity and his years on the bench, were additional possible mitigating factors. The Commission found little weight in these factors, however, pointing out that the judge’s intensity may have contributed to his impatience and inability to appreciate the perspectives of others, and his years on the bench were not mitigating since he had engaged in a pattern of misconduct during his time in judicial office.

The Commission concluded that removal was the appropriate sanction.

Commission members Judge Risë Jones Pichon, Ms. Lara Bergthold, Judge Madeleine I. Flier, Mr. Michael A. Kahn, Mrs. Crystal Lui, Mrs. Penny Perez, Ms. Barbara Schraeger, and Dr. Betty L. Wyman voted in favor of all the findings and conclusions and the removal of Judge Van Voorhis from office. Commission member Mr. Marshall B. Grossman did not participate.

Commission members Justice Vance Raye and Ms. Ramona Ripston dissented in part from the Commission’s decision. Justice Raye’s dissent expressed the view that the judge’s mistreatment of counsel did not constitute willful misconduct, and that the judge’s comments to the jury did not constitute misconduct. The dissent also expressed the view that Judge Van Voorhis’s conduct did not warrant removal from office, when viewed in comparison with the conduct of other judges who had been removed or censured. Ms. Ripston’s dissent agreed with Justice Raye’s that removal was too harsh a sanction for the judge’s conduct; Ms. Ripston noted, however, that some of the past judicial conduct cases discussed in Justice Raye’s dissent might be decided differently today, particularly those raising issues of race and gender bias.